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This paper offers a reflection on the relevance of Nietzsche to recent geographical 
scholarship. It starts by questioning the more general relationship between geography 
and philosophy/theory and interrogates what we might mean by theoretically 
sophisticated geographies. Drawing on a specific context -  the postcolonial apology 
in contemporary Australia – the paper turns to the relevance of Nietzsche’s thinking 
about morality, in charting everyday moral geographies and imagining more ethical 
futures. 
 




‘how then did that other “gloomy thing”, the consciousness of guilt, the 
entire “bad conscience” come into the world?” Friedrich Nietzsche 1887 On 
the Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay ‘Guilt, bad conscience and related 
matters’. 
 
I write this paper as a geographer. I take that positioning to be both an acutely 
important and utterly relevant caveat to an essay such as this, written (as it initially 
was) in response to an invitation to think upon the lines of engagement between my 
own geographical scholarship and the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche. I am not a 
philosopher. I do not call the way I think ‘philosophising’. My work practices – how I 
do research – have little in common with how most philosophers go about their work 
of producing knowledge. Nor do I imagine, or yearn for, the destination of my work 
to be ‘philosophy’.i It is unfashionable in these inter-disciplinary times to set down 
boundaries such as this. In doing so I am not implying a disinterest in philosophical 
questions, nor a wish to turn my back on what nowadays we often dub ‘theory’. On 
the contrary, my research enthusiastically engages with a number of philosophical 
thinkers, one of which has been Nietzsche. But I am acknowledging that my 
engagement with Nietzsche occurred under very specific circumstances, the most 
important of which was delivered by the phenomenon I and my co-author in that 
work, Haydie Gooder, were trying to understand: the controversy over an apology 
being given to Australian Aborigines. That apology was called for by Aborigines  
seeking recognition and reparation for the sense of loss caused by the forced removal 
of children from their families, what was dubbed ‘the stolen generation’ (Gooder and 
Jacobs, 2000).  Many non-Aboriginal Australians, including Prime Minister John 
Howard, resisted (even resented) the call for an apology and the emergence of what a 
so-called ‘black armband history’ of the nation upon which it was predicated. But 
other Australians faced the revelations about the past of the nation and welcomed the 
opportunity to say sorry. The national strategy for dealing with this heady mix of 
injury, bad conscience, resentment, memory work and reparation, was reconciliation. 
As I will explicate below, the nature of that process took us to one small contribution 
in Nietzsche’s wider thinking on morality, this being his treatise entitled: ‘guilt, bad 
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conscience and related matters’, originally published as part of On the Genealogy of 
Morals (1887), hereafter GM.  
Because I am not a philosopher what we did then and what I may, in the 
future, ‘do’ with Nietzsche has not a great deal to do with the agendas that enliven the 
circumscribed territory of philosophy. Indeed, our limited engagement with Nietzsche 
may very well be judged ‘bad’ by the ideals and aspirations of philosophers. 
Recognising such a difference is not done in order to legitimate geography turning its 
back upon the philosophical ideas of others, nor as a defensive deference, in which it 
is assumed that only philosophy can philosophise. Rather, it is done to underline the 
importance of geography itself. Nietzsche came into our research because what he had 
to say about his philosophical predecessors was relevant to the features of a 
geographically and historically specific postcolonial dilemma. Of course, Nietzsche 
does not magically become part of the mix of accounting for certain processes in 
postcolonial Australia: he is connected to this geographical moment by myself and 
my collaborator who, at that time, were living and working in that postcolonial 
context. And he came to us as scholars by way of traceable pathways of reading and 
living networks of colleagues who were themselves finding new relevance for 
Nietzsche. I am, then, putting geography first in my account of ‘why Nietzsche?’ 
(O’Hara, 1981). To do so is, in my view, part of a wider ethic of scholarship. I am 
sceptical of geographies in which observations about the world are unconvincingly 
(indifferently) attached to ‘big name’ theory. I shy away from geographies in which 
the exegesis of the ideas of the latest ‘big name’ theorist seems only interested in 
drawing us in as rapturous converts or leaving us behind as lost souls. For me the 
question of ‘why any philosopher?’ is always also a question of whether or not it 
produces more sophisticated geographies. 
My choice of the adjective ‘sophisticated’ is deliberate for it captures the 
ambiguous effects I know to be produced among many of my colleagues by 
geographies that are self-consciously in conversation with philosophers (like, say, 
Nietzsche). The word ‘sophisticated’ has come to have a common use meaning as 
something that is worldly-wise, not naïve, complex, clever. Etymologically the word 
derives from the ancient Greek term ‘sophic’ (pertaining to knowledge) and to that 
earliest of scholar, the ‘sophist’ (one who was engaged in the pursuit and 
communication of knowledge). A common dictionary definition of the term 
‘sophistication’ still carries such a positive sense. But the term ‘sophistication’ tilts 
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also in another direction, towards the less positive notion of sophistry. Sophistry is the 
process of investing knowledge with fallacious or misleading argument.  This 
negative meaning of ‘sophistication’ is itself derived from philosophy and, 
specifically, from the negative interpretation first Plato and then Aristotle gave to the 
project of the early sophists. Among other things the early sophists were teachers 
who, for a substantial fee, provided training in speaking persuasively.ii As Susan 
Jarratt (1991, xv) notes, their credentials in teaching the art of rhetoric derived in part 
from their experiences of different cultures: ‘they believed and taught that notions of 
“truth” had to be adjusted to fit the ways of a particular audience in a certain time and 
with a certain set of beliefs and laws’. This model of knowledge was antithetical to 
the Aristotelian belief in wisdom as pertaining to permanent truths, and justified his 
division of rhetoric from the pursuit of other more probable or certain knowledges 
The sophist’s knowledge (rhetoric) was adulterated, disingenuously altered, a 
perversion and it stood in sharp relief to philosophy. Barbara Cassin (2000, 105) has 
referred to this as the process by which philosophy itself made the sophists into its 
negative alter ego, it ‘bad Other’.  
Nowadays, the sophist’s sensitivity to difference would not necessarily result 
in their project being so negatively construed. Indeed, Jarratt’s own positively 
inflected reclamation of the sophists turns upon the fact that they were ‘skeptical 
about a divine source of knowledge or value’ and instead sensitive to knowledge as 
formed ‘in historically and geographically specific contexts’ (xx). One way of 
thinking about this is to say that the ancient sophists were both geographers and 
philosophers. Although it is also to admit that it was their geography – their emphasis 
on the situatedness of knowledge – that was their undoing in relation to later 
developments in philosophical thought. This arrangement stands in contrast to that we 
see in many contemporary geographies, in which it is their claim to being 
philosophical that can give rise to a scepticism among some readers. Indeed, when 
‘big theory’ touches empirically grounded geographies indifferently or when ‘big 
theory’ seems to preclude doing empirically grounded geographies altogether, then 
the claim against such geographies may even be that they are a disingenuous 
alteration or perversion of the geographical project, a less genuine geography lacking 
reality or relevance. I might even rephrase the pertinent question as follows: is a 
sophisticated geography good or evil?  
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The relationship between good and evil was of course a specific concern for 
Friedrich Nietzsche, and much of his work was developing a critique of (modern) 
morality. The Sophist played an important (if fragmentary) part in that emergent 
critique (see Consigny, 1994, for an overview) and he saw them as both ‘co-workers’ 
and ‘precursors’ to his own project. In the broad, Nietzsche’s philosophical project 
was set against what he construed to be the deadening after-effects of Socratic and 
Platonian thinking and the advocacy of unconditional truths and dogmatic moral rules 
(Consigny, 1994, 11). Indeed in a replication of sophistical thinking, Nietzsche’s 
methodology for returning to the Sophists (his ‘genealogy’) admitted partiality and 
interest (his position). His investigations were always presented as interpretation as 
opposed to truth and his writings celebrated the creativity of the agonistic, 
competitive rhetorical episteme within which the Sophists operated. In short, 
Nietzschean epistemology converged with the sophistic model of knowledge in that it 
was conditional and anchored in the specificities of situations. So too did his morality. 
The sophists, like Nietzsche, repudiated objective truth and, in so doing, relinquished 
the ability and right to discern and articulate dogmatic moral rules on how one ought 
to behave (Consigny, 1994, 16). Nietzsche read this as an explicit effect of geography. 
The sophists, he asserted, ‘juxtapose the multiplicity (the geographical relativity) of 
the moral value of judgments’ (Nietzsche, 1968, 428).  
What constitutes a moral geography in a world of difference has been an 
important thread within recent critical geographical thought (Sayer and Storper, 1997; 
Proctor and Smith, 1999; Smith 1997, 1998, 2000). In geographical grapplings with 
the interface between moral philosophy and ethics, the role of geography (understood 
as a specific place or location) on moral thinking and practice has gathered 
considerable attention. Smith (2000, 99) calls this the ‘moral force of place’. With a 
view that caries traces of sophist reasoning, Robert Sack (1997, 8) argues that 
geography is not only ‘at the foundation of moral judgment’ but also that moral goals 
‘must be set and justified by us in places as inhabitants of a world’. As convenient as 
it might be for geographers to claim a moral geography on the basis of locational 
specificity alone, other geographical concerns have simultaneously required thinking 
more relationally and normatively. Indeed the tension between universalism and 
relativism has had emergent moral geographies navigating their way precariously 
between the solid rock of ‘universalism’ and the slightly harder place of 
‘particularism’ (McDowell, 1995, 292). For example, Sack’s admission of a place-
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based morality is tempered by his warning that if place (specificity) is too ‘thick’ in 
the making of moral frameworks then they would be too partial, and foreclose upon a 
more transcendent view (Sack 1997, 257). David Smith’s (2000) sustained account of 
moral geographies grapples further with the fact of particularity and the desire for 
transcendence, by deciphering a ‘deeply geographical distinction in morality’ between 
sympathy for the close and familiar (a morality of feeling) and concern for distant and 
different others (a morality of reason).  
This essay does not seek settle a course through this perilous terrain in order to 
prescribe parameters for the future practice of human geography – a normative 
morality. Rather it adds to the growing body of scholarship within the discipline on 
everyday moralities: ‘grounded, contextualized and…concrete’ (Proctor, 1998, 11). 
Such geographies may be seen as mere descriptive moralities, but they bare 
immediately upon metaethical themes such as those Nietzsche was grappling with 
when he harnessed the Sophists to his critique of the tradition of discerning timeless 
and placeless moral truths. When we wrote our geography of reconciliation in 
postcolonial Australia our interest lay in charting the situated genealogy of moral 
claims and their uneven effect. The sophisticated genealogies of morality produced by 
Nietzsche provided a template and analytical guide for our work. His genealogies 
exposed the conditions by which moral worlds were made and lived, and charted the 
co-dependency between the descriptive particularity of moral claims and the universal 
drives (interests) of normative claims.  
Nietzsche is often misinterpreted as being against morals, even against ethics. 
But his performed ‘immorality’ is only ever in relation to the specifics of what stands 
for morality in his time – what he considers to be a narrow morals. This includes 
Christianity most obviously. It also incorporates other breeds of modern morality such 
as the law and concepts of justice – many of which, in the West at least, are 
derivatives of Christian morality. This variant of morals, Nietzsche argues, restricts 
the ways in which we imagine ourselves, and ourselves in relation to others. This is 
why he is interested in the  ‘genealogists of morality’, not because he believes them or 
in their rules and codes (‘they aren’t good for anything’, he says), but because he 
wants to situate and circumscribe their claims. On the Genealogy of Morals was a 
genealogy of those ‘genealogists’ and his work provided a startling model for a 
psychology of the priestly class. In Nietzsche’s use of the term ‘genealogy’ we are 
seeing a critical historicising of the concept of morality in line with a more general 
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methodology of de-naturalisation, subsequently taken up by Foucault. This is why 
Maudemarie Clark and Alan Swensen (2002) translate the title of On the Genealogy 
of Morals to be On the Genealogy of Morality, thereby emphasising Nietzsche’s 
interest in the conditions by which ‘morality’ is produced and maintained and its 
effects. This was not so much a question of the origins of morality but the value of 
morality and whether they obstruct or promote ‘human flourishing’ (Nietzsche GM 
2002). iii  
‘Gloomy’ emotional states like guilt and ‘bad conscience’ come into view for 
Nietzsche because he believes them to be the outcome of ‘morality’ or, more 
precisely, what Brian Leiter (2002) refers to as ‘morality in a pejorative sense’. For 
Nietzsche these are symptomatic emotional states for they demonstrate the 
constraining hold of modern morality. Guilt, for example, he views as an auxiliary 
invention, a psychological accessory that secrets away and manages a range of more 
raw and unrestrained feelings that morality does not want to allow – this is why he 
interprets it as the ‘animal soul turned against itself’ (GM). Guilt, Nietzsche observes, 
has its origins in the ‘pre-moral’ notion of debt and the relationship of obligation 
established between buyer and seller – a relationship that was elaborated through the 
violent history of contract law in which suffering (a pound of flesh, say) could stand 
as a satisfying and satisfactory compensation for a debt not paid. And it is, at this 
point, important to register that the pleasure of that suffering, is not solely in the 
hands of the creditor. Through the work of ‘bad conscience’ the debtor too feels the 
cruel pleasurable relief of sacrificing, say, that pound of flesh. Such ‘bad things’ 
become perverse preordinations of how we should relate, constraining the very terms 
by which we might act ethically and precluding the emergence of a more properly 
ethical – because openly relational, contingent and imaginative – world.  
 
One moral geography 
Nietzsche’s ideas had immense resonance with my colleague, Haydie Gooder, and I 
in terms of what we were observing of settler-indigenous relations in Australia during 
the 1990s (Gooder and Jacobs 2000).  At that time, Australia was actively engaged a 
state-sanctioned process for thinking, speaking and enacting settler – Aboriginal 
relations differently: this was the process of reconciliation. Reconciliation was a 
political process best understood as expressing something of what Judith Butler 
(1997) might refer to as a ‘psychic life’, in this case of a post-colonising national 
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subjectivity. It included talk about material recompense around dispossession of land, 
but that material calculation was overtly linked to other calculations about other 
injuries experienced by Aboriginal society under colonisation. Centrally, it included 
acknowledging the emotional and cultural damage that was wrought upon Aboriginal 
communities by the long history of Aboriginal children being taken into institutional 
care by the state and various church agencies. The history of the ‘Stolen Generations’ 
and the cultural and emotional injury it caused Aboriginal society was central to the 
reworking of settler-indigenous relations at that time. 
At the contentious heart of the reconciliation process was the matter of an 
apology. In 1997 an Inquiry by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children 
from their Families had been released in a report entitled Bringing Them Home 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1997).  The Inquiry investigated the painful 
consequences of the forced removal, in the name of assimilation, of ‘half-caste’ 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families and homes. The 
Inquiry into 'The Stolen Generation' brought into public view a previously hidden part 
of the nation’s history. In one of its many and wide-ranging recommendations, the 
Inquiry called for those involved in forced removals (governments, churches, police 
forces and welfare agencies) to apologize to indigenous Australians. Many agencies 
did apologies, although the Federal Government failed to deliver what indigenous 
Australians felt to be a properly worded apology. Haydie Gooder and I set about 
documenting the way in which the failure of the Federal Government to deliver a 
‘proper’ apology brought together large numbers of settler Australians in a collective 
expression of sympathy towards Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. This is a 
group we dubbed the ‘sorry people’. In the absence of a proper national apology there 
was a proliferation of 'minor' apologies, an unprecedented outpouring of popular 
sympathy toward indigenous Australians. Throughout the 1990s, streets were 
crowded with whites marching to remember the Stolen Generations, people queued to 
sign sorry books, local organisations held reconciliation football carnivals, and many 
non-Aboriginal Australians confused by these new revelations about their nation’s 
past voluntarily attended reconciliation workshops where they were re-taught the 
history of the nation from an indigenous perspective. This pedagogical function is a 
kind of 'mnemotechnic', a device for assisting the memory, and it somewhat clumsily 
seeks to replace an unconscious imprint of a nation properly formed, with a 
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consciousness of the real history of the nation. Such remembering was an essential 
precursor, for a postcolonial apology requires the offender to 'recall' and be 'mindful' 
of the past so that he or she might move on to a restored state of being (Tavuchis 
1991: 8). For Tavuchis the proper apology 'acknowledge[s] the fact of wrong doing, 
accept[s] ultimate responsibility, express[es] sincere sorrow and regret, and 
promise[s] not to repeat the offence' (1991: vii). In this sense, reconciliation asks that 
the past be revisited in the hope that this process might ordain a new future (Nietzsche 
1994: 61). Reconciliation both actively reflects on the past and attempts to achieve 
mastery over what Nietzsche described as 'the whole somber thing called reflection'. 
(1994: 62) 
Sorry people were, then, settler Australians who, in the face of revelations about 
Australia’s hidden (we might say actively forgotten or repressed) colonial past, came 
to feel they had lost the Australia they once knew and loved. They assumed not only 
feelings of guilt but also the mantle of responsibility for assuaging the legitimacy of 
their national subjectivity being compromised. They begin to experience a form of 
settler melancholia, an unresolved grief for a lost idea of nation. Judith Butler’s 
adaptation of the Freudian diagnosis of melancholia to understand subjectivity is 
useful here. She describes the way in which melancholia establishes itself in relation 
to the loss of an external object or ideal (1997: 179).  In melancholia, there is a refusal 
to break the original attachment to the lost object or ideal and it becomes internalized, 
drawn into the ego, which absorbs both the love and the rage felt towards the lost 
object/ideal.  This reconfiguration of the 'topography of the ego' results in self-
beratement and guilt (a form of narcissism).  In this sense, melancholia substitutes 'for 
an attachment that is broken, gone, or impossible' (Butler 1997: 24). The proliferation 
of apologies from settler 'sorry people' is a symptom of this melancholic entrapment. 
Their sense of guilt or ‘bad conscience’ fuelled their excessive work of sorry saying 
as they sought to recover an idea of a moral national subjectivity. Gooder and I 
interpreted this state of melancholic subjection as an important postcolonial moment 
for through this guilt Aboriginal Australians are relationally empowered. Thinking in 
Nietzschean terms, settler Australians suddenly see Aboriginal Australians as ‘injured 
creditors’, to whom they are indebted.  In the eyes of the guilt-afflicted settler it is 
Aborigines alone who hold the power to end their suffering by, say, accepting their 
apologies and offering forgiveness.  
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Our original investigations into this postcolonial reversal held some reservations 
about the ultimate effect of this inversion. Guided by a Nietzschean method of 
genealogy, we understood that what we were observing in Australian reconciliation 
was not simply emotions entering politics, or a joyous postcolonial inversion of settler 
– Aboriginal relations of duty, but the making and re-making of morality in a specific 
geographical context. And while the effects of that morality was to relationally 
empower indigenous Australians vis a vis some guilt-afflicted settlers, it was at the 
same time – with all its politely restrained concepts of reconciliation and its 
transactions of apologies and forgiveness –  a consolidation, extension and 
elaboration of the Christian moral codes that had, from first contact, so shaped the 
nature of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relations. It is worth dwelling on what this 
means in terms of the creative potential of the moral restructuring postcolonial 
Australians are currently engaged in. As I have indicated, one of the key genealogies 
charted in GM is that of Christian morals. Nietzsche argues that Christian morality 
emerged among a class of oppressed as a self-interested reaction to, and challenge 
against, the social and economic domination of the Roman Empire. Through the 
creation of Christian values the oppressors and their moral world was de-valued. In 
short, Christianity, he is arguing, is a revaluation of values driven by the ressentiment 
felt by the oppressed to the oppressor and he implies (although this aspect is under-
developed) that this was a postcolonial manoeuvre. In comprehending this reversal of 
fortunes Nietzsche is careful to make clear that transformation comes in the form of 
re-action, charged by the logics of ressentiment. 
We have already flagged the memory work that attached itself to reconciliation. 
And we have also already suggested how the melancholic mood felt by ‘sorry people’ 
appears to position such guilt-ridden settlers in a relation of deference to the newly 
acquired power (to forgive) held by indigenous Australians. In short, some of the 
memory work going on through reconciliation in contemporary Australia is about de-
valuing the structure of good and evil held within pre-revisionist histories of the 
nation. In so doing it is a reaction to the ressentiment of indigenous Australians 
towards colonial pasts. But does this restructuring deliver a joyous postcolonial 
moment? Reconciliation remains a ‘gloomy thing’ and not just because once 
empowered settler Australians now feel less legitimate. It is ‘gloomy’ because the 
moral infrastructure that Aboriginal ressentiment has delivered is already held within 
the very Christian morality that colonialism delivered.  The structure of guilt and 
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forgiveness encapsulated in the apology testifies to this. The drive to create an ‘on 
record’ apology is proof of a settler subject actively transforming him or herself from 
‘colonialist’ into that fantasized subject of the postcolonial nation. And, as Tavuchis 
has noted, individuals and collectives who apologize 'promiscuously and excessively' 
often lack a sense of 'autonomy' and 'firm social identity' (Tavuchis 1991: 40). 
Perhaps it is unsurprising that one newspaper inadvertently referred to Sorry Day as 'a 
national day of atonement' (The Age 19 May 1998). Such a slip confirms that standing 
centre stage of such apologetic re-action was not the sorrow of The Stolen 
Generation, but the desire of those settler Australians for absolution for past sins. 
The reason that Nietzsche embarked on his genealogy of morality was in order to 
clear away moral orders that he felt prevented the emergence of a more imaginative 
ethical creativity. We shared that interest and that moral goal when we too set about 
investigating closely the situated circumstance of Australia’s postcolonial moral 
restructuring. It might well be that the kind of moral world of which reconciliation is 
a part – structured as it is out of ressentiment, requiring as it does the internalised bad 
conscience, and drawing as it then must on a dance of apology and reparation – can 
only deprive us of the kinds of forces that are needed to cease being reactive and to 
move beyond colonialism (Deleuze, 1986).  Although the process of reconciliation 
has done much to recognise indigenous experiences of colonialism and to restructure 
the sentiment of the nation, it cannot herald a more radical relational ethical.  That 
becoming will be forestalled until Australians release themselves from the 
straightjacket of morality that constrains not only the work we do in the name of 
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i For example David Smith has complained that the nexus between moral philosophy 
and geography is a ‘one-way street’. Despite a resurgence of interest in ethics in 
geography, there is, he noted, ‘little evidence that moral philosophers have any 
interest in or knowledge of the subject-matter or literature of geography’ (1997, 584). 
ii It was the acquiring of fees which has, in some accounts, been offered as evidence 
of the fact that the sophists wielded knowledge in a self-interested fashion, as opposed 
to the deploying of knowledge in pursuit of ‘higher’ goals such as wisdom, virtue, 
even justice and democracy (Cassin, 2000, 106) 
iii Although Nietzsche’s method of genealogy is said to have been the model for 
Foucault’s non-essentialist, post-origins historico-philosophical method, Leiter (2002, 
166-7) has questioned this on the grounds that Nietzsche sought to provide a ‘real 
history of morality’.  
